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The aim of this study is to describe the macroeconomic dynamics of natural disasters and 
their determinants in a large sample of disaster events, the first such attempt we are aware 
of. Our research shows that natural disasters have a statistically observable adverse 
impact on the macroeconomy in the short-run. Not surprisingly, costlier events cause 
more pronounced slowdowns in production. Yet, interestingly, developing countries, and 
smaller economies, face much larger output declines following a disaster of similar 
relative magnitude than do developed countries or bigger economies. A close study of the 
determinants of these adverse macroeconomic output costs reveals several interesting 
patterns. Countries with a higher literacy rate, better institutions, higher per capita 
income, higher degree of openness to trade, and higher levels of government spending are 
better able to withstand the initial disaster shock and prevent further spillovers into the 
macroeconomy. These all suggest an increased ability to mobilize resources for 
reconstruction. Financial conditions also seem to be of importance; countries with more 
foreign exchange reserves, and higher levels of domestic credit, but with less-open capital 
accounts appear more robust and better able to endure natural disasters, with less adverse 
spillover into domestic production.  
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1.  Introduction 
Natural disasters have resulted in significant economic and human loss for millennia. 
Major recent catastrophic events — such as the December 2004 tsunami disaster in the 
Indian Ocean, the Pakistani Kashmir earthquake of October 2005 and the September 
2005 inundation of New Orleans following hurricane Katrina — have brought the human 
and material cost of these crises to the forefront of public attention worldwide.  
  Natural disasters also figure prominently in discussions on future preparedness, 
especially in relation to the evident warming of the planet and the attendant changes in 
the patterns of climatic events that are predicted to accompany such warming (IPCC, 
2007).
1 The United Nations, for example, reports that: “Since 2000, some 1.6 billion 
have lost their homes or livelihoods or have suffered other damage [as a result of a 
natural disaster – IN]. This continues an upward trend over the past several decades and 
represents a four-fold annual increase, on average, from the decade of the 1970s.” 
(Schwartz, 2006). 
The United Nation’s Integrated Regional Information Network notes, “while the 
number of lives lost has declined in the past 20 years - 800,000 people died from natural 
disasters in the 1990s, compared with 2 million in the 1970s — the number of people 
affected has risen. Over the past decade, the total affected by natural disasters has tripled 
to 2 billion.” (IRIN, 2005). Therefore, much research in both the social and natural 
sciences has been devoted to increasing our ability to predict disasters, prepare for them 
and mitigate their costs.
2 Curiously, few economists participate in developing this 
research agenda, and not many attempt to answer the many economically relevant 
                                                 
1 Increasing levels of greenhouse gases, changing sea, land and air temperatures, rising sea levels, changing 
patterns of rain and snow and an unstable climate are all likely catalysts of future events.  
2 Much of this effort can be accessed through: http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/  3
questions relating to natural disasters. 
Almost all the current research on the topic focuses on disasters ex ante, as is 
done in the large preparedness literature that aims to describe how societies should better 
prepare themselves to the onset of disasters and reduce the direct damage they cause. In 
contrast, we focus on the natural disasters’ ex post impact on the macroeconomy. We 
measure and estimate the costs of these crises in terms of forgone production, and using a 
comprehensive international macroeconomic panel dataset, we critically examine several 
hypotheses regarding the determinants of these costs. Given the importance of the 
problem, it is somewhat surprising that this has not been done before. Our effort enables 
us to compare the incidence and costs of disasters across geographical areas and income 
levels and provide answers to several hypotheses regarding structural and policy-related 
aspects of these costs. 
In the next section, we discuss the existing economic literature and highlight our 
contribution to it. In the following sections we discuss the data, methodology, and 
findings of this paper. We conclude by pointing out some policy implications of our 
findings, and put forth a future research agenda on this topic. 
 
2. The economics of natural disasters 
Economic research on natural disasters is only in its infancy with very few papers 
examining any facet of disaster phenomena. Two exceptions of well developed research 
strands are worth noting. There is a significant body of micro-development research 
which examines the ways in which (especially rural) households prepare and deal with 
sudden unexpected income shocks (such as draughts) and their ability to insure against   4
these shocks (e.g., Townsend, 1994; Paxson, 1989; and Udry, 1994). The second existing 
strand examines specific case studies - disaster events - such as the devastating hurricane 
Mitch in Honduras, and estimates some of the specific costs and consequences of those 
individual events (e.g., Benson and Clay, 2004; Halliday, 2006; Holtz-Eakin, 2005; 
Horwich, 2000; Narayan, 2001; Selcuk and Yeldan, 2001; and Vos et al., 1999). 
The first strand is indirectly related to our investigation as it suggests that 
institutional characteristics and policy choices may have an impact on the 
macroeconomic consequences by shaping the individual households’ decisions following 
disasters. The second strand is more directly relevant as a source for our hypotheses. The 
difficulty in judging the general applicability of the findings reported in these case 
studies, however, is part of the justification for our comparative work. Our findings may 
provide indication of any general conclusions that otherwise can only be derived with a 
meta-analysis relying on a large number of such case studies. 
As far as we know, there are only very few papers that examine any 
macroeconomic facet of natural disasters using a multi-country, multi-event framework. 
These are briefly discussed below, though none of them attempts to answer the questions 
we pursue hereafter. The first recent attempt to empirically describe macro-aspects of 
natural disasters is Albala-Bertrand (1993). In this seminal monograph, Albala-Bertrand 
develops an analytical model of disaster occurrence and reaction and collects data on a 
set of disaster events: 28 disasters in 26 countries during 1960-1979. Based on before-
after statistical analysis, he finds that GDP increases, inflation does not change, capital 
formation increases, agricultural and construction output increase, the twin deficits 
increase (the trade deficit sharply), reserves increase, but no discernible impact on the   5
exchange rate is observed. The patterns of onset and recovery observable in this dataset 
are then described with a special emphasis on the political economy aspects of the events 
themselves. Rasmussen (2004) conducts a similar tabulation of the data for Caribbean 
Islands.  
Skidmore and Toya (2002) examine the long-run impact of natural disasters on 
growth. They count the frequency of natural disasters for the 1960-1990 period for each 
country (normalized by land size) and pursue an empirical investigation of the correlation 
of this measure to average measures of economic growth, physical and human capital 
accumulation and total factor productivity for this 30 years period. Skidmore and Toya’s 
(2002) paper investigates long-run trends (averages) in contrast with our aim of 
describing the short-run dynamics of the macroeconomy following disasters. Long-run 
analysis raises questions of endogeneity in disaster impact that are, to a large extent, not 
relevant for the short-run.
3 Furthermore, their use of a cross section is conceptually and 
empirically very different from our reliance on a panel framework. 
In the paper closest to ours in its interest, Raddatz (2007) investigates the external 
sources of output volatility in low income developing countries. Using a VAR approach, 
the paper analyses the contribution of various external shocks, natural disasters among 
them, in explaining output fluctuations. For our purposes, Raddatz’s (2007) finding that 
natural disasters do have an adverse short-run impact on output dynamics is of interest.
4 
Raddatz’s (2007) focus on several types of external shocks, and its VAR approach, 
                                                 
3 Skidmore and Toya’s (2002) work utilizes the frequency of disasters; yet it important to note that only 
those disasters that resulted in significant damages get registered in the EM-DAT (see section 3). The issue 
is highlighted by the finding of another strand that identifies per capita income as a significant determinant 
of the direct costs of natural disasters (see Kahn, 2004; and Skidmore and Toya, 2007). 
4 Yet, Raddatz (2007) concludes that only a small fraction of the output volatility in a typical low income 
country is explained by external advrse shocks (which include disasters).   6
preclude it from answering the various questions posed here with respect to the 
determinants of the observed output declines following disasters. 
  
3.  Data 
The data on natural disasters and their human impact are documented in the EM-
DAT database with data collected by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Disasters (CRED).
5 The EM-DAT database has worldwide coverage, and contains data 
on the occurrence and effects of natural disasters from 1900 to the present. The database 
is compiled from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental 
organizations, insurance companies, research institutions and press agencies. The EM-
DAT data is publicly available on CRED's web site at: www.cred.be. 
CRED defines a disaster as a natural situation or event which overwhelms local 
capacity, necessitating a request for external assistance. For a disaster to be entered into 
the EM-DAT database at least one of the following criteria must be fulfilled: (1) 10 or 
more people reported killed; (2) 100 people reported affected; (3) declaration of a state of 
emergency; or (4) call for international assistance.
6 These disasters can be hydro-
meteorological disasters including floods, wave surges, storms, droughts, landslides and 
avalanches; geophysical disasters - earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions; and 
biological disasters covering epidemics and insect infestations (these are much more 
infrequent). 
                                                 
5 Established in 1973 as a non-profit institution, CRED is based at the Catholic University of Louvain in 
Belgium. 
6 The number of people killed includes “persons confirmed as dead and persons missing and presumed 
dead”; people affected are those “requiring immediate assistance during a period of emergency, i.e. 
requiring basic survival needs such as food, water, shelter, sanitation and immediate medical assistance.”   7
The amount of damage reported in the database consists only of direct damages 
(e.g. damage to infrastructure, crops, housing) and do not include the indirect or 
secondary damages – an attempt to estimate these secondary effects is, in part, our aim 
here. We utilize three reported measures of the magnitude of the disaster: (1) The number 
of people killed (DKIL); (2) the number of people affected (DAFF); and (3) the amount 
of direct damage (DDAM). For the years 1970-2003, we have data on the number of 
people killed for 507 disaster events, the number of people affected for 466 events, and 
the amount of damage in 428 events. 
Since we presume that the impact of a specific natural disaster on the macro-
economy depends on the magnitude of the disaster relative to the size of the economy, we 
standardize our disaster measures. We divide the measures for the number of people 
killed or affected by the population size in the year prior to the disaster year; and divide 
the direct cost measure of the disaster by the last year’s GDP (since the current year’s 
population and GDP have been affected by the disaster itself). Furthermore, since it is 
likely that a disaster that occurred in January of 1995 will have a bigger impact on the 
macro-economy in the same year than a disaster that occurred in December, we weigh 
our measure based on the month in which the disaster occurred (or began). Specifically, 
the disaster measures ( ) we employ in our specifications are calculated based on 
the cost measure (
DMS
DM ) and the onset month (OM ):  
(12 ) /12 DMS DM OM =−   .     (1) 
From the outset, it should be clear that doubts have been expressed about the 
accuracy of data on natural disasters; especially because often the major source of these 
data (national governments) has an interest in inflating the measured impact. Yet, since   8
biases should by systemic, using data from one source should provide information about 
the relative magnitude of disasters and should thus be appropriate for the hypotheses we 
examine here.
7
Data on GDP growth, per capita income levels, CPI inflation, unemployment rate 
and population, as well as the other macroeconomic control variables, comes primarily 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Because of data availability 
constraints, our panel covers the years 1970-2003. Exact detailed are provided in the data 
appendix. 
The data on natural disasters is described in tables 1 and 2. In table 1, we provide 
the main statistical characteristics of the 3 measures of interest; the mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum. In table 2, we divide our sample by income level 
and regional location and describe the means, medians, and number of observations we 
have for each region. From this table, we note that disasters apparently are significantly 
more costly for developing countries than they are for developed ones.
8 Disasters in 
South-, South-East, and East Asia are also more costly (in both human life and property 
damage) than those occurring in the Middle East, and Latin America. This might be at 
least partly a result of the higher population density in Asia. More striking is the 
difference between island-states and all other geographical regions. Islands are apparently 
very vulnerable to disasters, with costs to life, the number of people affected, and the 
property damage incurred all are, on average, twice as large as in any other region. 
 
                                                 
7 Furthermore, if stated damages are indeed biased upward, than the size of the estimated coefficients is 
biased downward (see Hausman, 2001, for more details). 
8 At least some of this difference, though, can plausibly be accounted for by a selection bias due to different 
reporting practices. It is likely that for developed countries, smaller disasters (in terms of costs to life or 
property) will also be reported to CRED.   9
4.  Methodology and results 
  Our main aim in this paper is to describe the macro-economic consequences of 
natural disasters. In particular, we estimate the indirect costs to output – the reduction in 
GDP growth – the typically result from a natural disaster. We start by examining the most 
parsimonious specification: 
,, 1 , , it i it it i i t yy D M S X α βγ φ − =+ + + +   ε    (2) 
where  is the GDP growth rate, , it y , it DMS is our measure for disaster magnitude, and 
, i X   are control variables commonly used in the growth literature. Following Islam 
(1995) and most subsequent research on short-run GDP growth empirical models, we add 
to the specification a GDP growth lag ( ,1 it y − ).
9 Country-specific effects are introduced in 
order to account for the widely varying average growth experiences among different 
countries over the past two decades. This setup explicitly removes the cross-sectional 
long-run differences which were the focus of Skidmore and Toya (2002). 
In our estimates we follow a procedure first suggested by Hausman and Taylor 
(1981) that takes into account the bias in estimation of panels with predetermined and/or 
endogenous variables. For a rigorous formulation of this bias see Nickel (1981). The 
Hausman-Taylor three-step estimation methodology is an instrumental variable estimator 
that takes into account the possible correlation between the disturbance term and the 
variables specified as predetermined/endogenous. The estimated equation is thus: 
11 22
,, 1 , , , it i it it i i i t yy D M S X X α βγ φφ − =+ + + + +    ε
                                                
   (3) 
 
9 The use of only one lag is supported by recent research (e.g., Uribe and Yue, 2006, and Raddatz, 2007).   10
where 
1
, i X   are the control variables assumed to be (weakly) exogenous and 
2
, i X   are 
assumed to be predetermined/endogenous and thus correlated with the country specific 
term.
10
  In the first step, least squares estimates (from a country fixed-effects model) are 
employed to obtain consistent but inefficient estimates for the variance components for 
the coefficients of the time-varying variables. In the second step, an FGLS procedure is 
employed to obtain variances for the time-invariant variables. The third step is a weighted 
IV estimation using deviation from means of lagged values of the time-varying variables 
as instruments. Identification in the Hausman-Taylor procedure requires that the number 
of exogenous variables be at least as large as the number of time-invariant 
predetermined/endogenous variables. The exogeneity assumption requires that the means 
of the exogenous variables (
1
i X ) will be uncorrelated with the country effects ( i α ).
11, 12
The Hausman-Taylor methodology is intended to overcome the possible 
correlation between the country specific effects and the independent variables in a 
dynamic panel set-up. Yet, in order to argue for the causal effect of the disaster variables 
                                                 
10 Given the construction of our disaster variable as ratio of pervious year’s domestic product, this variable 
is clearly predetermined. We do note that classifying the disaster variable as exogenous does not change 
any of the results we report (when it is classified as predetermined/endogenous).   
11  ( )
1
1






= ∑ N  
12 Under the plausible exogeneity assumption described above, the Hausman-Taylor (HT) procedure 
provides asymptotically consistent estimates, but it is not the most efficient estimator possible. For a 
dynamic panel set-up, more efficient GMM procedures rely on utilizing more available moment conditions 
to obtain a more efficient estimation (e.g., Arellano and Bond, 1991). This procedure, however, is usually 
employed in estimation of panels with a large number of individuals and short time-series and in our case, 
the number of instruments used will be very large (and the system will be vastly over-identified); see 
Baltagi (2005). Furthermore, the data makes this procedure difficult to implement for most specifications of 
the model; see Greene (2002) on the practical difficulty in implementing AB-GMM. Hutchison and Noy 
(2005) compare these methodologies and show that using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM framework 
in similar growth specifications the coefficients do not change noticeably when compared to the Hausman 
and Taylor (1981) estimates, though their statistical significance increases as predicted.   11
on our macroeconomic measures of interest (mainly GDP growth), we require further 
assumptions. We see no a priori reason to argue that these disaster measures will face any 
reverse causality from the GDP growth variable (i.e., GDP growth will Granger cause 
future disasters); we thus assume full exogeneity of these measures. This assumption is 
also adopted by the two other papers that use a disaster measure as an independent 
variable, albeit in different specifications (Raddatz, 2007 and Skidmore and Toya, 2002). 
To verify that the way we construct the disaster measure using lagged GDP levels (see 
eq. 1) does not insert any endogeneity into our measure we also run the same 
specifications using a binary indicator of disaster occurrence and find the qualitative 
results identical. A further informal test of the exogeneity assumption is to compare the 
distribution of the independent variables for the disaster and no-disaster observations. We 
find no statistically observable difference in their means. 
Preliminary results presented in table 3, without the control variables, point to two 
general conclusions. There is no evidence of any correlation between the disaster 
population variables (number killed or affected) and GDP growth (table 3 columns 2 & 
3). However, we obtain strong indication that the amount of property damage incurred 
during the disaster is a negative determinant of GDP growth performance; and also find 
that larger disasters, or those that happen earlier in the year, have a more adverse affect 
(table 3 column 1).
13
To further investigate whether there are any reasons to suspect the way we 
constructed the damage variables created any endogeneity problem, we convert the 
disaster measures we have into binary indicators (1=disaster, 0=no disaster) to examine 
                                                 
13 This might be construed as hardly surprising, and is in line with the Raddartz (2007) conclusion. But, it is 
distinct from the conclusions presented in Skidmore and Toya, (2002) in their research on the long-run 
effect of disasters, and is also in contrast with some of the descriptive case studies (e.g., Horwich, 2000).   12
whether this changes our results.
14 Again, we find a significant coefficient for the damage 
variable in these specifications (table 3 columns 4-6). 
Next, we examine specifications that also include other control variables 
commonly found in the empirical growth literature. The additional determinants of output 
in this model are a set of domestic policy, structural, and external factors, as well as 
country-specific effects and the lagged output growth already included in the 
specifications presented in table 3. The domestic policy factors are changes in 
government budget surpluses, inflation, investment, and credit growth. External factors 
include the current account and foreign direct investment inflows; and the structural 
factors we consider are the openness of the economy to international trade (import ratio), 
a measure of institutional quality and a binary measure for financial crises.
 15 All of the 
variables, with the exception of financial/capital-flows-stop crisis measure, are 
introduced with a one-year lag in order to capture the delayed response of output to 
macroeconomic developments. Exact details on measurements and sources are included 
in a data appendix. 
Since our preliminary investigation in table 3 only yielded significant results for 
the property damage measure of crises, we focus only on this measure in all the following 
specifications. In our benchmark specification (table 4 column 1), we include the disaster 
measure and the other variables previously described. For the control variables, better 
institutions, lower credit growth, a higher current account surplus, larger FDI inflows and 
the absence of a financial crisis are all significantly associated with higher GDP growth. 
                                                 
14 Because the binary approach masks the distinctions between the magnitudes of different disasters, we 
only record (binary variable =1) those disasters whose magnitude is bigger than the mean for that type of 
disaster data. 
15 For a discussion of sudden capital inflow stops (financial crises), and their empirical importance in 
growth dynamics, see Hutchison and Noy (2006).   13
Past investment growth, the government deficit, the inflation rate, or imports do not seem 
to have a discernible impact on output performance in our specifications. We note that 
since the disaster measures are most likely strongly exogenous, we anyway do not expect 
their estimated coefficients to be affected by the inclusion of these controls (compare 
table 4 column 1 to table 3 column 1).  
In columns 2 and 3 of table 4, we split our sample into developed countries 
(defined as 1990 members of the OECD) and developing countries (the rest). The 
obvious conclusion is that the negative impact of natural disasters on the macroeconomy 
is entirely due to output dynamics in the developing countries sample. This description 
does not apply to developed countries. One possible reason is the amply documented 
ability of developed countries to pursue counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policy 
following adverse shocks – an ability that does not seem to be enjoyed by lower income 
countries who often end up pursuing pro-cyclical policies in the face of external shocks. 
We further investigate whether big economies are more or less vulnerable to the 
impact of natural disasters. We now split the sample by the median size of the economy 
(measured in constant US$). We find, maybe not surprisingly, that small economies are 
more vulnerable to an event of the same size (relative to their size). This may be due to 
the fact that smaller economies are less diversified, and their ability to withstand external 
shocks, especially to their agricultural sector, is thus diminished. We investigate these 
issues further in the next tables. 
The economic importance of these statistically identifiable effects is very real. A 
one standard deviation increase in the direct damages of a natural disaster in a developing 
country will reduce output growth by about 9%. We obtain similar magnitudes for small   14
economies. The effect on developed countries is statistically significant but the economic 
importance is only marginal with the observed increase lower than 1%. 
In further specifications, we aim to answer several questions regarding the 
determinants of the output declines identified in the previous tables. Specifically, we 
would like to examine whether institutional and structural aspects of the ( , it Z ) of the 
economies struck by disasters have any bearing on the magnitude of output decline that 
typically follows. We thus estimate the following specification: 
,, 1 ,, , , , 1 () it i it it it it it it i t yy D M S D M S Z Z X α βγ δ τ φ −− =+ + + ⋅ + + + ε    (4) 
The coefficient on the interaction of the natural disaster measure and the 
institutional/structural macroeconomic variable (δ ) will define the effect of these 
characteristics on the magnitude of the output loss.
16
  We describe our hypotheses and the results concerning structural/real 
characteristics of the economy in table 5 and financial characteristics in table 6. We first 
examine whether the level of human capital affects the impact of a financial crisis. It is 
likely that in economies in which the level of human capital is higher, the impact of loss 
of physical capital on the macroeconomy will be lower. We confirm this in table 5 
column 1 in which we include the level of illiteracy interacted with our damage variable. 
We find the coefficient is negative and significant suggesting that countries with higher 
level of illiteracy will experience a more adverse affect on output growth as a result of a 
natural disaster.
17
                                                 
16 We also include the direct affect of the institutional/structural factor (τ) to verify that the identified 
interaction coefficient is not significant because of the direct correlation of the institutional/structural factor 
and output growth. 
17 A measure of illiteracy is the only proxy for human capital that is available in the World Development 
Indicators database in wide enough coverage to maintain our sample size.   15
  In columns 2 and 3 of table 5, we examine whether a higher institutional quality 
(as measured in the Institutional Country Risk Guides) and higher per capita income 
levels (in PPP$) have any impact on the macro-cost of a disaster. We find that indeed 
both institutional strength and higher per capita incomes are associated with a statistically 
significant lower macroeconomic cost. The importance of governing institutions can be 
attributed either to the direct efficiency of the public intervention following the event’s 
onset, or to the indirect impact of an efficient government response in shaping private 
sector response to the disaster. Our conclusions about income levels corroborate the 
observations we made in table 4 regarding the difference in output dynamics between 
developed and developing countries. This result can plausibly be attributed also to the 
wider diversification observed in higher-income countries and their ability to counter 
exogenous shocks with counter-cyclical fiscal policy (while fiscal policy in poorer 
countries is typically pro-cyclical). 
  We next turn to other structural aspects of the domestic economy and find that a 
bigger government (measured as government consumption as percent of GDP) and a 
higher level of exports (as percent of GDP) are both associated with a lower macro-cost 
of a natural disaster. Both findings are plausible; it is likely that a bigger government will 
be able to mobilize more resources more rapidly for reconstruction, and that a country 
that is more open to trade will experience a smaller negative shock to the demand for its 
products. Countries open to trade may also be more likely recipients of larger 
international capital inflows to aid in the reconstruction effort.
18
                                                 
18 Yang (2006) uses the incidence of hurricanes to examine the consumption smoothing role of 
international financial flows and finds that foreign aid inflows increase following hurricane events, and, for 
poorer developing countries, so do remittances. The net aggregate flows to developed countries do not   16
  It has also been hypothesized that geographical location might be a factor in 
determining the macro-economic secondary costs of disasters. For example, a tropical 
climate might be conducive to spreading infectious diseases ex post and thus slow down 
the recovery process; especially when needed resources have to be spent to combat this 
possibility. We measure the percent of the land area in each country which is in the 
tropics (between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn - 22.5 degrees north 
and south, respectively). Once this tropics measure is interacted with the property damage 
variable, we find evidence of the opposite effect – a tropical country is likely to 
experience higher growth than one which is located outside the tropics following a 
natural disaster. A potential explanation is the greater ability of agriculture to rebound in 
tropical climates (where there may well be 3 crop cycles per year).  
Finally, since insurance, credit, and financial flows all play a role in disaster 
recovery, we examine whether financial market conditions matter for the consequences of 
natural disasters. We start by examining whether the depth of the financial system matters 
for disaster costs. We proxy the financial system with two measures: the size of the 
domestic stock market (stock market capitalization – table 6 column 1) and the level of 
domestic credit (table 6 column 2). We find no evidence that the stock markets are 
important in insulating economies from the macroeconomic impact of disasters. On the 
other hand, we do observe that more domestic credit appears to reduce the costs of 
disasters in terms of foregone output growth.  
We next examine whether the degree of openness of the capital account matters 
for the output dynamics following the disaster. Yang (2006) finds some evidence of 
                                                                                                                                                 
seem to change following hurricane exposure. Raddatz (2007) finds that aid flows increase after climatic 
disasters but decrease after geological ones. 
   17
capital flight following disaster events – in his paper: hurricanes. We therefore include a 
variable that measures the degree of de jure openness of the capital account. This 
measure extends between -2.5 to +2.5 and is described in detail in Chinn and Ito (2006). 
Maybe not surprisingly in light of Yang’s (2006) observations, countries with open 
capital accounts seem to experience larger drops in their output growth following 
disasters.  
Since this is one of the more surprising results in this paper, we repeat this 
specification using a different measure of capital account openness (column 4). Our 
second measure, taken from Edwards (2006), is constructed from different primary 
sources and measures openness between 0-100. This measure varies less over time than 
the Chinn-Ito index. Qualitatively, we find the same results for this measure. Though the 
interaction term, while negative, is no longer statistically distinguishable from the null of 
no effect. 
Finally, we also examine whether the amount of hard-currency reserves held by 
the authorities matters – reserves can be though of, in this case, as a buffer stock against 
the capital outflows documented by Yang (2006). We do find that countries with larger 
stocks of reserves (measured in months of imports) experience lower output declines 
following the disaster events (table 6 column 5). 
 
5.  Conclusions and caveats  
Our preliminary empirical investigation on the macroeconomic costs of natural 
disasters, the first such attempt we are aware of, yielded a number of interesting 
observations. Natural disasters have a statistically observable impact on the   18
macroeconomy when these are measured by the amount of property damage incurred. 
Alternative measures relying on population indicators (number killed and number 
affected) do not present any statistically identifiable evidence of macroeconomic costs. 
Furthermore, we found the developing countries face much larger shock to their macro-
economies following a disaster of similar relative magnitude than do developed countries. 
Similarly, small economies seem to be more vulnerable than larger ones to these same 
natural adverse events. 
We follow up and examine the determinants of these output costs and find that 
countries with higher literacy rates, better institutions, higher per capita incomes, larger 
governments and higher degree of openness to trade appear to be better able to withstand 
the initial disaster shock and prevent it effects spilling deeper into the macroeconomy. 
Financial conditions also seem to matter. Countries with less open capital accounts, more 
foreign exchange reserves, and higher levels of domestic credit appear more robust and 
able to endure natural disasters with less spillover to GDP growth rates. 
We also note that we found no evidence to support rejections of a further set of 
hypotheses. Because of the usual statistical weaknesses of macro panels, we hesitate to 
conclude that we can confirm any of these hypotheses but rather that, for whatever 
reason, we have been unable to reject them. We have examined, and found no evidence, 
that: the relative size of the agricultural or mining/minerals sectors matters; that island 
economies are more vulnerable to the disasters’ indirect costs; that big countries (in land 
area) are less vulnerable; and that inflation, poverty rates and unemployment increase 
following disasters.   19
We note several important caveats. In this paper, we do not attempt to examine other 
impacts on the macroeconomy, such as the effects on the government budget, crowding 
out effects of reconstruction spending or monetized deficits. Identifying these channels 
and their empirical importance is important for policy-making post disasters. A 
preliminary exploration of the effect of disasters on investment suggests that investment 
(measured by gross capital formation) indeed increases immediately following the 
disaster event but then declines significantly in the following year. A more exhaustive 
description of these dynamics is left for future research.  
Our investigation also did not examine the ex post policy changes that might be 
triggered by the disaster onset and should therefore be accounted for as part of the true 
impact of the crisis. Disasters clearly might be catalysts for dramatic policy changes. 
These disaster-as-a-catalyst for change effects are harder to identify without a more 
detailed description of the political economy of post disaster recovery and reconstruction. 
Empirical identification will require a whole new set of identifying assumptions that we 
find no support for.  
The impact of aid on the macroeconomic consequences, on output growth, inflation 
and employment, are also worth exploring. Even the direction of aid flows following 
disasters appears to be difficult to pin down as Benson and Clay (2004) argue there are no 
observable increases in aid inflows (except possibly for very large events), and Yang 
(2006) and Raddatz (2007) finding the opposite.
19
Furthermore, our research focused on rapid-onset disasters and, to a large extent, 
ignored the macro-dynamics of slowly developing natural events such as draughts and 
famines. The reasons for this omission are two-fold. First, the empirical methodology and 
                                                 
19 Though both Yang (2006) and Raddatz (2007) restrict their results to specific sub-samples.   20
data necessary to estimate the impact of slowly developing events will have to be quite 
distinct from the methodology employed here. Second, famines are not entirely (or even 
largely) naturally occurring events and can often be considered man-made. As such, a 
different set of exogeneity assumptions will be necessary in order to evaluate their costs. 
Our estimates also do not evaluate the long-run impact of natural disasters on growth. 
While Skidmore and Toya (2002) do provide estimates of the long-run effects, these rely 
on a cross sectional dataset, in which it is impossible to control for the obvious time-
invariant differences between countries. A possibly more appropriate framework to 
account for these differences is a methodology similar to that pursued by Barro (1997). 
This is also left for future research as long-run growth accounting will necessitate a very 
different framework than that pursued here. 
More important than the possible avenues for future research mentioned above is the 
question of the impact of natural disasters on poverty. A framework to identify the 
interactions between poverty rates, vulnerability to and impacts of natural disasters and 
the variations in poverty levels should be developed in cross country settings to 
complement and enrich the work that has already been done on specific case studies. 
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Data Appendix  
Variable: Definition: Source: 
DDAMG  Damage from disaster (% of GDP)  EM-DAT and the WDI* 
DAFFP  Number of people affected by disaster (% of population)  EM-DAT and the WDI 
DKILP  Number of people killed by disaster (% of population)  EM-DAT and the WDI 
GDPG GDP  growth  WDI 
RR Institutional  strength  International Country Risk 
Guides 
ILIT  Illiteracy (% of population)  WDI 
CAPM1  De jure capital account openness index  Chinn and Ito (2006) 
CAPM2  De jure capital account openness index  Edwards (2006) 
GDPPC  GDP per capita (in constant 1995 US$)  WDI 
GCON  Government consumption (% of GDP)  WDI 
EXPORT  Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)  WDI 
TROPIC  % of land area in the tropics  Gallup et al. (1998) 
SMCG  Stock market capitalization (% of GDP)  World Bank’s financial dataset 
FOREX  Foreign exchange reserves (% of imports)  WDI 
DOMCRE  Domestic credit in banking sector (% of GDP)  WDI 
GCFGL  Gross capital formation (annual % growth)  WDI 
DOMCREL  Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP)  WDI 
CAL  Current account surplus (as % of GDP)  WDI 
BUDGETL  Government budget surplus including grants (% of GDP)  WDI 
INFLL  Inflation rate (CPI)  WDI 
IMPGL  Imports (% of GDP)  WDI 
FDIL  Foreign direct investment (as % of GDP)  WDI 
SSHNG  Financial crisis  Honig (2005) 
* World Development Indicators, 2006 CD-ROM.  22
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics for Disaster Variables 
Variable Mean  S.D. Min. Max.  Obs.
DDAMG 0.026  0.120 0.000 1.486  428
DKILP 0.085  0.654 0.000 11.047  507
DAFFP 5.438  12.686 0.000 98.767  466
Correlation:        DKILP-DAFFP: 0.61  DKILP-DDAMG: 0.32  DAFFP-DDAMG: 0.50 







Table 2 – Means/Medians for Disaster Variables by Region (obs.) 
 DDAMG  DKILP  DAFFP 
Developed Countries  0.000 / 0.000 
(51) 
0.000 / 0.000 
(51) 
1.43 / 0.05 
(50) 
Developing Countries  0.029 / 0.001 
(377) 
0.094 / 0.001 
(456) 
5.92 / 0.90 
(416) 
Latin America  0.002 / 0.000 
(83) 
0.003 / 0.000 
(86) 
3.77 / 0.62 
(85) 
East Asia  0.086 / 0.006 
(81) 
0.379 / 0.006 
(101) 
9.87 / 0.80 
(69) 
South- & South-East Asia  0.005 / 0.001 
(42) 
0.014 / 0.001 
(48) 
6.25 / 1.28 
(48) 
Middle-East & North-Africa  0.028 / 0.000 
(77) 
0.011 / 0.001 
(91) 
2.13 / 0.28 
(90) 
Africa  0.015 / 0.003 
(71) 
0.014 / 0.001 
(74) 
9.02 / 1.50 
(70) 
Islands  0.127 / 0.018 
(54) 
0.560 / 0.053 
(68) 
16.35 / 1.21 
(36) 
For descriptions and sources of the variables, see section 3 in text and the data appendix. The 
number of observations is indicated in parentheses.   23
Table 3 – Disaster Cost Regressions - Benchmarks 
  Crisis measure in monthly shares  Binary crisis 
Variable (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DDAMG  -86.956 
2.054     -9.564 
4.800    
DAFFP   0.477 
0.841     0.314 
0.833   
DKILP     743.336 
0.775     0.314 
0.833 












Observations  1574 1574 1574 1574 1574 1574 
Adj-R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
F-test  3.02 2.96 2.96  72.93 2.96 2.96 
Note: The table reports the change in GDP growth from natural disasters and other control 
variables (dependent variable is GDP growth) in response to a 1 unit change in the variables. 
Regression is estimated with the Hausman-Taylor (1981) random effects algorithm. The 
associated t- statistics are noted below each estimated coefficient. ***, **, * indicate the 
significant level at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively.  Table 4 – Disaster Cost – Benchmarks by Size and Income Level 
























































































































Observations 1574  374  1138  745  767 
Adjusted-R2  0.16 0.36 0.14 0.10 0.29 
F-test  3.38 7.45 2.84 2.05 5.98 
Note: The table reports the change in GDP growth from natural disasters and other control 
variables (dependent variable is GDP growth) in response to a 1 unit change in the variables. 
Regression is estimated with the Hausman-Taylor (1981) random effects algorithm. The 
associated t- statistics are noted below each estimated coefficient. ***, **, * indicate the 
significant level at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively.   
Table 5 – The Determinants of Disaster Costs – Real variables 
Variable
1


















































































































































































Observations  980 1512 1488 1496 1504 1500 
Adjusted-R2  0.20 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.16 
F-test  3.68 3.18 3.09 3.48 3.52 3.24 
Note: The table reports the change in GDP growth from natural disasters and other control variables (dependent 
variable is GDP growth) in response to a 1 unit change in the variables. Regression is estimated with the 
Hausman-Taylor (1981) random effects algorithm. The associated t- statistics are noted below each estimated 
coefficient. ***, **, * indicate the significant level at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively.   
Table 6 – The Determinants of Disaster Costs – Financial variables 
Variable 
1






















































































































































Observations  867 1506 1225 1462 1491 
Adjusted-R2  0.28 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.17 
F-test  statistic  5.07 3.53 4.27 3.36 3.45 
Note: The table reports the change in GDP growth from natural disasters and other control variables 
(dependent variable is GDP growth) in response to a 1 unit change in the variables. Regression is estimated 
with the Hausman-Taylor (1981) random effects algorithm. The associated t- statistics are noted below 
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